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TAXATION OF THE TREASURES OF THE SEA
JOHN J. KENNYt AND RONALD R. HRUSOFFtt
TO SPEAK of "treasures of the sea" evokes for most of us visionsborn in childhood, of pirates and 'buried chests and all the trap-
ping of the Robert Louis Stevenson tales. And in fact the gold coins
and precious stones sought by Elizabethan adventures still exist; cur-
rent periodicals record their recovery with surprising frequency. How-
ever, today's explorer more often seeks the commonplace minerals -
oil and sulphur - and is most concerned with the tax aspects of his
venture. This article will attempt to pinpoint, and perhaps answer, a
few of the tax problems connected with treasure hunting.
A treasure hunting venture can be organized in the same manner
as any other business activity. However, exploration ventures lend
themselves to more flexible structures than many other businesses, and
for this reason certain tax savings are available. That is, the organizers
have a choice between three different modes of operation, each with
its own peculiar advantages and each 'best adapted to a different factual
situation: (1) operation as private entrepreneurs; (2) operation as a
corporation; and (3) operation as a Subchapter S corporation. The
option to operate in the noncorporate form should be carefully exercised,
for such a determination bars the explorers from making effective use
of a corporation should they have a change of heart. We shall first
discuss the noncorporate amateur operation, and then turn our atten-
tion to the corporate form - especially the Western Hemisphere Trade
Corporation. Finally, the Subchapter S corporation - something of
a compromise between the other two - will be considered.
I. NONCORPORATE OPERATION
The entrepreneur who discovers or develops one of the treasures
of the sea naturally hopes to maximize 'his profits. Such maximization
will be greatly enhanced if any profits will receive capital gains treat-
ment, and capital gains treatment requires a bit of tax planning in the
formative stages of the venture. The capital gains provisions are among
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the oldest in the Tax Code,' dating from the Revenue Act of 1864.2
Sadly, they also rank among the most confused and least satisfactory
of all sections.' This is due in no small part to the fact that the
statute represents a compromise between contradictory tax theories,4
coupled with an attempt to stimulate the investment sector of the
economy.5 It is unfortunate that greater attention was not given at
the outset to the economic theories upon which the capital gains provi-
sions rest. It is even more unfortunate that Congress in the formative
1. The capital gains provision first became a permanent part of the Code in
1921. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 206, 42 Stat. 232.
2. Ch. 173, § 116, 13 Stat. 281 (1864). This enactment, by present standards,
was extremely crude providing only "that net profits realized by sales of real estate
purchased within the year for which income is estimated, shall be chargeable as
income. . . ." In 1867 the tax was extended to property purchased within two years.
Act of March 18, 1867, ch. 169, § 116, 14 Stat. 478. The 1867 Act was held constitu-
tional in Gray v. Darlington, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 63 (1872).
3. The Senate Minority Report, S. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 2,
at 6 (1921), in a sense anticipated this problem when it pronounced that the bill "is
wholly unsatisfactory from any standpoint. The country is bound to be dissatisfied .. "
See also Surrey, Definitional Problems in Capital Gains Taxation, 69 HARV. L. REv.
985, 987 (1956) :
[W]hen Congress in the Revenue Act of 1921 introduced the term "capital gain"
into our technical tax law and was therefore faced with the problem of defining
that term, it was embarking upon a journey through areas previously unexplored
in this country. When we turn from the beginning of that journey in 1921 and
pass over thirty-five years to arrive at the present definition in the Revenue Code
of 1954 we see that while Congress has added many maps and charts and much
elaborate equipment, it has not uncovered a clear and useful trail.
4. One theory urges Congress to tax capital gain at regular income rates. It is
argued that the individual receiving the gain is receiving the same amount of purchas-
ing power that he would receive from an equal amount of ordinary income. There-
fore, he should pay the same tax. This line of reasoning discounts any need to
stimulate investment by favorable tax treatment. The opposing theory demands that
no tax be placed on capital gain and that the government look solely to income, not
appreciation, for its revenue. In support of this position it must be remembered that
mere increase in the value of a security, however many times it may be transferred,
produces no economic gain. And these profits will be taxed, indirectly through the
increased income they will generate when reinvested, or directly through the estate tax.
KEYNEs, THE GENERAL THEORY or EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND MONEY 212 (Har-
court, Brace ed. 1935) ; cf. Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 581 (1965) (Harlan,
J., concurring). The present tax structure attempts to straddle both theories. Gain
is taxed at less than full rates - evidently with some thought of encouraging invest-
ment - and the income from the investment is taxed at full rates. Standing by itself
the theory is not without merit; however, once the purity of either system was
abandoned, Congress has found it easy to enact a series of special exceptions whereby
ordinary income will receive capital gains rates. A retreat to either of the two
primary theories would substantially simplify the entire structure.
5. H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 10-11 (1921), indicates that
Congress gave some thought to the possibility that investment in capital assets would
be stimulated by taxing capital gains at less than full rates. As this was fourteen years
before Keynes came out with THE GENERAL THEORY or EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND
MONEY and as Congress consistently increased rates during the depression - off-setting
its pump-priming efforts - a serious question is raised whether Congress actually was
aware of the full impact a tax-cut (especially one on capital gain) would have on the
investment sector of the economy. See generally PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 167 (1954). Serious consideration of the tax-structure vis-i-vis economy had
to wait until after the Second World War. See Joint Committee on the Economic
Report, Economics of Capital Gains in Taxation, in FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR GROWTH
AND STABILITY, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 367-419 (1955) ; Cf. INT. REv. CODE or 1954,
§§ 38(a), 46(a) (1) (7% tax credit for profits reinvested in the business) [references
to the 1954 Code will hereinafter be by section only].
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years shifted from one concept to another6 and now steadfastly refuses
to reassess these theories, preferring instead to add a special interest
provision here, tighten a restriction there, or alter the rates or the
holding period at almost every session.7 "Capital gain", as it is com-
monly called,8 results from the sale 'by a taxpayer of a capital asset9
other than property held "primarily for sale to customers in the ordi-
nary course of his trade or business."'" The simplicity of the definition
is deceptive; for even today, years after enactment, great uncertainty
6. In 1921 the House bill provided that all gain in excess of $29,000 would be
taxed at a flat rate of 12%2%. Amendments in the Senate required the taxpayer to
only include 40% of the gain in his income where it would be taxed at regular rates.
S. Doc. No. 73, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 21-22 (1921). As enacted the statute was a
compromise. Capital gain (from property held over two years) was separated from
ordinary income and taxed at a flat rate of 12Y2%. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136,
§ 206, 42 Stat. 232.
The 1934 Act contained two new concepts. Embodied in the House Bill was
Secretary of the Treasury Morganthau's proposal that capital losses be set-off only
against capital gain. He complained that taxpayers were maximizing their positions
by realizing their losses in the first two years when they could be deducted from
ordinary income while delaying their gains in order that they would be taxed at the
capital gains rate. H.R. Rtp. No. 704, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1934). The House
Ways and Means Committee determined that the percentage of gain or loss to be
taken into account should vary with the length of time the asset was held. The
amount decreased in four steps from 100%, if held less than one year, to 40%, if held
for more than five. H.R. REP. No. 704, supra at 10. With two minor exceptions the
Senate agreed. It added a fifth bracket - 30% at ten years - and allowed the first
$2,000 of loss to be taken against ordinary income. S. RnP. No. 558, 73rd Cong., 2d
Sess. 12 (1934).
The House in 1938 attempted to refine the steps. It proposed that the amount
of gain required to be included in the taxpayer's net income fall 2% each month the
asset was held over a year until the seventy-sixth percentile was reached; at that
point the reduction dropped to 1% a month for the next three years. H.R. RE.
No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 8, 33-34 (1938). The Senate found this stepdown
provision too complicated and rejected the entire concept. It substituted a provision
similar to the one in existence today. The Senate version taxed all assets held over
eighteen months at one-half of the taxpayer's normal rate, not to exceed 15%. S. RtP.
No. 1567, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 5-7, 19-22 (1938). In conference the inevitable com-
promise was reached. The final bill adopted the Senate holding period of eighteen
months; but a modified step scale was imposed: If the property was held for over
eighteen but less than twenty-four months, two-thirds of the gain would be included;
if it was held over twenty-four months only 50% was required to be added to net
income. In any event the capital gain would not be taxed at more than 30%. S. Doc.
No. 177, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 14 (1938).
The final change was made in 1942. 50% of the gain was required to be in-
cluded in net income if the property was held for six months while the ceiling was
reduced from 30 to 25%. The justification for reducing the holding period was that six
months was adequate to divide the speculators from the investors. S. RP. No. 1631,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1942).
7. It is periodically suggested by the ABA, the Treasury, or a Congressional
leader that the capital gains provision be modified. The President's 1963 tax message
was typical of many of these suggestions. He proposed that the percentage-inclusion
factor be lowered from 50 to 30% while the holding period was extended from six
months to one year. See H.R. 11629, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962); H.R. 2721, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1961) ; H.R. 9060, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). None of these bills
were enacted.
8. By this we mean long-term capital gain, § 1222(3), taxed at one-half of tax-
payers regular rate not to exceed 25%. §§ 1201(b), 1202.
9. Section 1221. Surrey believes that all property is to be treated as a capital
asset, unless specifically excluded. Surrey, Definitional Problems in Capital Gains
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cloaks almost every word in section 1221. Ultimately, judicial gloss
applied to the "trade or business" clause will determine the form the
venture ,takes and 'the moment of -sale.
Since the taxpayer who attempts to locate and recover a sunken
galleon can take out his profits only at the discovery stage, he is
more restricted than one who discovers and develops a mine. At
one time there was serious discussion based on the Tax Court's
Glenshaw Glass decision" that treasure trove would be exempt from
federal income taxation.'" Revenue Ruling 53-61" dashed this 'hope.
It provides that, "The finder of treasure-trove is in receipt of taxable
income, for Federal Income Tax purposes, to the extent of its value
in United States currency, for the taxable year in which -it is reduced
to undisputed possession." The Supreme Court then reversed Glen-
shaw Glass'4 and settled the question. However, as we will show, the
ruling does not necessarily mean that treasure trove (or other mineral
discoveries) is to be taxed at ordinary income rates - if held longer
than six months. More likely, it will be taxed at capital gains rates if
the taxpayer can qualify under one of two tests: (1) he must establish
that he is an amateur treasure hunter; or (2) he must establish that
he is not in the treasure-hunting business. As will appear, these two
tests are in reality the same.
In 1944 the Second Circuit, in Goldsmith v. Commissioner," re-
jected the argument that a playwright could receive capital gain when
he sold a play to Paramount Pictures on the ground that it was his
business to write and sell scripts. Scarcely two years later the Tax
Court, in Edward C. Myers," concluded that one not engaged in
developing patents primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of his trade or business - the so-called amateur inventor - was
entitled to treat profits from the sale of a patent as capital gain. Within
the year the Commissioner acquiesed in this decision.' 7 Four years later
the Service had sobering afterthoughts;" but by then Congress had
11. 18 T.C. 860 (1952) ; see also Highland Farms Corp., 42 B.T.A. 1314 (1940).
12. Note, Taxation of Found Property and Other Windfalls, 20 U. CHi. L. Rev.
748 (1953).
13. 1953-1 Cum. BULL. 17, now Treas. Reg. § 1, 61-1 4 (a) (1957).
14. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
15. 143 F.2d 466, 467 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 774 (1944).
16. 6 T.C. 258, 266 (1946). Myers was followed by Hofferbert v. Briggs, 178
F.2d 743 (4th Cir. 1949) ; Thompson v. Johnson, 50-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9428 (S.D.N.Y.
1950); Carl G. Dreymann, 11 T.C. 153, 162 (1948), nonacq., 1950-2 Cum. BULL. 5;
William Kelly, 6 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 646 (1947) ; cf. Ernest L. Fisher, 7 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 286 (1948). For an excellent discussion of the effect of the Myers decision
see, United States v. Zacks, 375 U.S. 59, 62, 68-69 (1963).
17. 1946-1 Cum. BUL.. 3.
18. The Commissioner withdrew his acquiescence. 1950-1 CuM. BULL. 7.
[VOL. 12 : p. 469
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already accepted the amateur versus professional distinction as a valid
principle of taxation:
When a person is in the profession of writing books, or creating
other artistic works, his income from the sale of the products of
his work is taxed as ordinary income ...
If an amateur receives royalties on his book or other artistic
work, they are treated as ordinary income, but if 'he holds his
'book or other artistic work for 6 months . . . and then sells it
outright he can avail himself of a loophole which treats such a
sale as the sale of a capital asset, not held primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of the taxpayers trade or busi-
ness. As a result the taxpayer receives long-term capital gain
treatment on the product of his personal effort.'9
By enacting what is now section 1221 (3)20 - specifically withdrawing
this privilege from all authors - Congress itself established the prin-
cipal that absent a statutory provision to the contrary, an amateur
who holds property which he created for longer than six months is
entitled to capital gains treatment. And in 1954 it reaffirmed this
principle while extending capital gains treatment to professional as
well as amateur inventors.2 Although -the Commissioner has in recent
years bitterly fought the amateur exemptions, the courts have stood
almost uniformly opposed to his position - with only the Supreme
Court at all sympathetic.2 The reasoning supporting the conclusion
that, absent statutory interference, an amateur inventor or writer is
entitled to capital gain is equally adaptable to a group of treasure
hunters.
Once the equation "amateur standing equals capital gains" is
established, emphasis shifts to drawing that thin line between the
amateur and the professional. Common sense tells us that our ex-
plorers cannot set up an exploring company and then claim to be
amateurs; but beyond this point, guidance must come from the copy-
19. S. Rp. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 43-44 (1950).
20. Enacted in 1950 as § 117(j) (1) of the 1939 Code.
21. Section 1235(a) ; S. RZP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 438-40 (1954). By
denying authors capital gains treatment while specifically extending it to inventors
Congress once again demonstrates, in a most telling manner, just how important
culture is to the American public. See Miller, Capital Gains Taxation of the Fruits
of Personal Effort: Before and under the 1954 Code, 64 YALEt L.J. 1, 10 (1954).
22. Cf. United States v. Zacks, 375 U.S. 59 (1963) ; see also United States v.
Midland-Ross Corp., 381 U.S. 54, 56-57 (1965) ; Commissioner v. Gillette Motor
Transp., Inc., 364 U.S. 130, 134-35 (1960) ; Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner,
350 U.S. 46, 52 (1955). One might ask why a part-time inventor should be accorded
capital gains treatment on the fruits of his labor while another person who "moon-
lights" in a drug store has his labors taxed as ordinary income. The answer defies
logic. It can only be put down as another of those inconsistencies surrounding the
capital gains provisions. See ALI, DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS IN CAPITAL GAINS
TAXATION 438-39 (1960); Miller, Capital Gains Taxation of the Fruits of Personal
Effort: Before and under the 1954 Code, 64 YALn L.J. 1 n.1 (1954).
SPRING 1967]
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right and patent cases. The decision most frequently cited in this regard
is Stern v. United States.23 While in the armed forces, Stern wrote a
novel, "Francis," The Talking Mule; the book was eventually made
into a movie, the profits from which became the subject of suit. Stern
claimed that they were capital gain; the Commissioner took the view
that they were ordinary income. Judge J. Skelley Wright held that
the case turned on whether Stern wrote the book as a hobby or as part
of his business, concluding:
[A] court should not be quick to put a man in business under
Section 117(a) simply because he has been successful in earning
extra income through a hobby or some other endeavor which
takes relatively small [sic] part of his time.
Here the taxpayer is a newspaper publisher and has been,
with the exclusion of the war years, actively directing newspapers
since 1938. Virtually his entire time has been given to that en-
deavor. As a hobby he has written a few short stories, some of
which have 'been productive of small amounts of income. On two
occasions he has written screen plays. He has created the charac-
ter Francis and written two novels about it. This literary work
has taken relatively little of his time. It was more or 'less a
relaxation from his principal employment. Under the circum-
stances, it can hardly be said that the taxpayer created "Francis"
to hold as "property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business.
24
Judge Wright suggests that three factors are controlling: (1) the
principal business of the taxpayer; (2) the relative amount of time
spent on his hobby; and (3) the money previously earned from the
hobby. 25
Of course, in most instances, the taxpayer's principal business is
plainly evident; more often than not it i's his sole business. Thus, in
Herwig v. United States,26 the Court of Claims had no trouble finding
that Kathleen Winsor was a housewife and her husband a student when
she wrote Forever Amber. And in Miller v. United States, 27 the same
court found that a plaintiff during the years in question "had no
occupation except to tend his vegetable garden, 'harvest his hay, feed
23. 164 F. Supp. 847 (E.D. La. 1958), aff'd per curiam, 262 F.2d 957 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 969 (1959).
24. Id. at 851.
25. Id. at 850-51.
26. 122 Ct. Cl. 493, 105 F. Supp. 384 (1952) ; cf. Rider v. Commissioner, 200
F.2d 524 (8th Cir. 1952) (math professor writing math books); Goldsmith v. Com-
missioner, 143 F.2d 466, 467 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 774 (1944) (self-
proclaimed playwright, even though he only wrote one play; thus produced ordinary
income when sold for a motion picture).
27. 339 F.2d 661 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
[VOL. 12 : p. 469
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 3 [1967], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol12/iss3/3
TREASURES OF THE SEA
and milk his cows, feed his neighbor's hogs, and do what was required
of him in connection with the sale of these lots. He was not a very
busy man. .... ,,28 But in many cases the taxpayer occupies himself
with several endeavors, and the court that attempts to separate his
various businesses is faced with a sticky task. Taxpayers have gen-
erally advocated the straightforward position that a man can have
only one business. If, for example, it is established that the taxpayer
is a dentist, he cannot then be in the realty business, and any profits
received from the subdivision of land he owns must be afforded
capital gains treatment. This approach has (if nothing else) the
merit of simplicity; but the courts over the past twenty-five years
seem to have gone out of their way to reject it.
29
While the courts seem definitely to have disapproved the view that
a taxpayer can have only one business, they have been considerably
less definite in evolving standards by which to-segregate the taxpayer's
"principal" business or businesses. The result has been a series of
decisions exceedingly hard to reconcile. W. R. Stephens Co. v. Com-
missioner" involved a car dealer who, during World War II, used
twenty-eight automobiles for various business purposes, selling them
for nearly new-car prices shortly after V-J Day. The court found that
he held cars for two distinct purposes - for company use and for
sale; in effect he was in two businesses, and capital gains were denied.
Early in 1966 the Supreme Court handed down Malat v. Riddle."'
The taxpayer was a real estate developer who acquired a plot of land
with the intention of subdividing and selling it or developing it, de-
pending upon which course appeared to be the most profitable. As it
turned out the property was sold. The lower courts ruled that the
taxpayer had failed to establish that the property was not held pri-
marily for sale in the ordinary course of business. In support of this
decision the Government urged that the Supreme Court adopt the
reasoning promulgated by various circuits courts that "a purpose may
be 'primary' if it is a 'substantial' one."'3 2 In a per curiam opinion the
Court rejected this definition merely stating, "We hold that, as used
in § 1221 (1 ), 'primarily' means 'of first importance' or 'principally.' "83
28. Id. at 663.
29. Ackerman v. United States, 335 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1964) ; Snell v. Commis-
sioner, 97 F.2d 891, 892 (5th Cir. 1938); see also Thompson v. Commissioner, 322
F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1963); Mathews v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 360, 361 (6th Cir.
1963) ; Jerome S. Murray, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 762, 781 (1965).
30. 199 F.2d 665 (8th Cir. 1952).
31. 383 U.S. 569 (1966); see also Hollywood Baseball Ass'n v. Commissioner,
352 F.2d 350 (1965), vacated in light of Malat, 383 U.S. 824 (1966).
32. Id. at 571.
33. Id. at 572.
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It would seem then that a rather large group of cases has been given
new standing. Margolis' v. Commissioner84 is typical. In Margolis
the taxpayer was a real estate dealer who subdivided and sold a plot
of land. As this purchase was considered incidental to his business
and for the avowed purpose of development of income property, capital
gains were allowed. In United States v. Hess 5 the same principle
was applied to compressed air cylinders. Finally, there is a line of
cases allowing funds received from the culling out of over-age animals
to 'be taxed at capital gains rates.8 6 It is hard to fathom out the
Supreme Court's reasoning or to grasp how the sale of culls - ac-
counting for perhaps twenty-five per cent of a farmer's income - can
be treated as separate from his business. Possibly the courts feel that
a money making -activity incidental to the principal endeavor merits
different treatment than an activity of the same magnitude entirely
divorced from the taxpayer's principal occupation. The rationale be-
hind such a distinction appears somewhat nebulous, at best. In fact,
it is entirely possible'that this line of reasoning may be inherent in
the background of Judge Wright's decision in the Stern case. Stern
was principally a publisher, but he was also a writer, and writing
several short stories, two screen plays and a novel could have been
deemed incidental to his true business - in which case the court would
be correct in allowing -him capital gains. However, if this rationale
forms any part of the decision in the Stern case, it remains completely
unverbalized.
The amount of time spent on the activity is 'by itself a poor test
of whether the taxpayer is engaging in a hobby or a business. As a
standard, it is unsound in theory; and in practice, establishing a cut-off
point beyond which the taxpayer can 'be' said to be operating a business,
rather than engaging in a hobby, is next to impossible. Indeed, the
somewhat related hobby-loss cases only mention this factor when the
taxpayer has spent full time on 'his hobby ;37 at that point it becomes an
indication that he is operating a business. Conversely, Judge Wright
speaks of a small or insignificant amount of time spent on the hobby;
34. 337 F.2d 1001 (9th Cir. 1964) accord, F. B. Tippins, Jr., 24 CCH Tax Ct.
Mein. 521 (1965) ; Hufford v. United States, 65-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9765 (E.D.
Wash. 1965).
35. 341 F.2d 444 (10th Cir. 1965).
36. Cedarburg Fox Farms, Inc. v. United States, 283 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1960);
United States v. Bennett, 186 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1951) ; Albright v. United States,
173 F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1949) ; Moore v. United States, 65-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9695
(N.D. Miss. 1965); accord; Municipal Bond Corp. v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 683,
687-88 (8th Cir. 1965) ; cf. Gotfredson v. Commissioner, 217 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1954),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 846 (1955) ; Fox v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1952).
37. See notes 129 and 142 infra and accompanying text.
476 [VOL. 12 : p. 469
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but no one speaks of the great middle ground between "full" time and
"insignificant" time. Thus it can only be concluded that this test i's
best used in connection with a series of subjective factors, or perhaps
to tip the balance in the close case. If the court believes the taxpayer's
activity is his primary ,business, its opinion will 'be fortified if twenty-
five to fifty per cent of the taxpayer's time is spent on this activity. How-
ever, if in the court's eyes the taxpayer's activity more closely resembles
a hobby, the same percentages become merely a balancing factor."
The most helpful of Judge Wright's tests is the third - that is,
the very nature of the venture should insure that it will be profitless
until the ultimate recovery (now sought to be taxed at capital gains
rates) is made; no series of small earnings - so often regarded as
negating an author's claim that he writes for pleasure 9 - will bar
capital gains treatment. This test is not completely valid, ,however,
because it fails to differentiate between the professional wildcatter and
the amateur adventurer, neither of whom will realize a profit until a
find 'is made. Nevertheless, compliance with this test adds color to the
taxpayer's claim, and so, despite its weakness, it cannot prudently
be ignored. Moreover, a recent panel of the Tax Court has proposed
a novel test.40 In a case where a taxpayer sold off a series of lots in
a passive manner, Judge Whitney, speaking for the panel, reasoned
that a property owner selling lots in a lackadaisical fashion could not
be in the real estate business. But the fact is that the bankruptcy
courts are full of passive companies, and much of the space in any
volume of legal reports is taken up with efforts to avoid the statute of
limitations - again the result of "passive" conduct. Thus, the court
is in effect saying that a sloppy real estate developer should receive
capital gains treatment (perhaps on the theory that he needs it to
realize a fair return), while an efficient operator must be content with
what ,he has left after the ordinary income tax has taken its bite.
Finally, mention must be made that the courts prefer to examine
a multitude of factors, but never state which are controlling - a
technique which seems to have originated with the Federal Communi-
cations Commission in its comparative licensing cases. The tax
38. Snell v. Commissioner, 97 F.2d 891, 892 (5th Cir. 1938), "The word, not-
withstanding disguise in spelling and pronuciation, means-business; it implies that one
is kept more or less busy.
39. This argument was raised in Stern v. United States, 164 F. Supp. 847, 851
(E.D. La. 1958), aff'd per curiam, 262 F.2d 957 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 969
(1959), and in Herwig v. United States, 122 Ct. Cl. 493, 495-96, 518, 105 F. Supp.
384, 389 (1952).
40. F. B. Tippins, Jr., 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 521, 526 (1965). On almost identical
facts the Ninth Circuit several years ago went the other way. Ehrman v. Commis-
sioner, 120 F.2d 607 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 668 (1941).
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courts, at least when attempting to define "business,"'" or when dealing
with "thin-incorporation"4 2 or "hobby losses," apparently have been
bitten by the same bug.4" While the individual considerations enumer-
ated in these cases are of no moment in dealing with the sale of an
underwater mine or recovered treasure, still the courts have, in adopting
this approach, served notice that all such factors may be considered
when they seek to determine a taxpayer's true business. And the more
subtle courts have also indicated that any attempt to apply "a color
test to match element by element" and so avoid classification as a
business is doomed to failure.44
How then can a taxpayer prove that he is an amateur explorer,
or, alternatively, that he is not in the "business" of discovering treas-
ures at sea? Frankly, there 'is no assurance that 'he can. This is the
failure of all multiple-factor tests - no matter what is done, there is
no guaranty that the court will not balance the factors in a manner
unfavorable to the taxpayer. Thus, in the last analysis, the taxpayer is
guided by little more than an intelligent guess.45
Nevertheless, prudence dictates that certain guideposts be fol-
lowed. For one thing, the adventurers must establish that their prin-
ciple -business is not underseas exploration. Standing alone, a showing
that they are, say, a group of dentists, will not carry the day. How-
ever, this factor takes on weight when accompanied by other indicia
41. United States v. Temple, 355 F.2d 67, 68 (5th Cir. 1966) ; Wineberg v. Com-
missioner, 326 F.2d 157, 160-64 (9th Cir. 1963); Thompson v. Commissioner, 322
F.2d 122, 125-27 (5th Cir. 1963); Miller v. United States, 339 F.2d 661, 663-64
(Ct. Cl. 1964) ; F. B. Tippins, Jr., 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 521 (1965); Walter F.
Tellier, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1062, 1069 (1963), aff'd, 342 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 687 (1966) ; see 3b MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 22.15,
at 75 (1958).
42. Foresum, Inc. v. Commissioner, 348 F.2d 1006 (6th Cir. 1965) ; Motel Co. v.
Commissioner, 340 F.2d 445, 446 (2d Cir. 1965) ; McSorley's, Inc. v. United States,
323 F.2d 900, 902 (10th Cir. 1963) ; Wilbur Sec. Co. v. Commissioner, 279 F.2d 657,
662 (9th Cir. 1960) ; Kruse Grain & Milling Co. v. Commissioner, 279 F.2d 123, 125-26
(9th Cir. 1960) ; Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399, 406 (2d Cir. 1957) ; Rowan
v. United States, 219 F.2d 51, 55 (5th Cir. 1955); Old Dominion Plywood Corp.,
25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 678, 693-95 (1966); see also ALI, INcoME TAX PROBLEMS
O1 CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 400-37 (1958); Weis, The Labyrinth of the
Thin Corporation, 40 TAXES 568 (1962).
43. See Du Pont v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 681 (D. Del. 1964) ; cf. Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 329, 331-32, 334, 344 (1962) ; see also United
States v. Drum, 368 U.S. 370, 382-86 (1962). In District of Columbia v. General
Motors Corp., 336 F.2d 885 (D.C. Cir. 1964), when the court applied a single test
rather than looking to a three-pronged standard to determine local franchise taxes, the
Supreme Court was quick to grant certiorari and reverse. 380 U.S. 553 (1965).
44. Thompson v. Commissioner, 322 F.2d 122, 126 (5th Cir. 1963).
45. The multi-factor approach due to its uncertainty has not been received kindly
in all quarters. Commissioner v. Pontchartrain Park Homes, 349 F.2d 416 (5th Cir.
1965). In Commissioner v. Pfaudler Inter-American Corp., 330 F.2d 471, 474 (2d
Cir. 1964), involving the question where a sale took place, the court made specific
reference to this problem: "by contrast, the 'substance of the sale' test set out in
Treasury Regulation § 1.861-7 (1957) - which provides that 'all factors of the trans-
action ... will be considered, and the sale will be treated as having been consummated
at the place where the substance of the sale occurred' - is vague and uncertain."
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of an amateur status - failure to incorporate the venture, absence of
a profit motive, or a passive approach to -the business aspects of the
operation. And in a treasure 'hunting venture this test can be easily met;
for all that is really required is that all members be employed,46 and that
none be employed in mineral exploration or salvage operations. The
second major indicator - the amount of time spent on the activity - is
more difficult to comply with; for the tendency in these projects is to go
overboard and spend almost as much time on the hobby as on the
parties' principal businesses. However, with the exercise of reason-
able restraint, such compliance is not impossible. If the activities
are limited to a summer - or even two or three summers, especially
if the family is taken along and the project turns -into a vacation - the
Commissioner will have difficulty supporting 'his contention that suffi-
cient time was put in to make the venture a business. 7 All other tests
are minor by comparison, and serve only to color the activity for or
against the taxpayer.
But even if all the tests mentioned are met, the Commissioner has
indicated, ,by his treatment of copyright and patent cases, that he will
be only too happy to make ,a test case out of the type of situation under
consideration. And while the Commissioner might not prevail in the
lower federal courts, he would stand a good chance of successfully
arguing that every serious exploration project is to be treated as a
business4" - at least to the extent of denying it capital gains treat-
ment - before the Supreme Court. Whether the Court would grant
certiorari in this type of case is, of course, another manner; but, in any
event, a test case can be an extremely expensive and trying experience
- perhaps worse in the long run than paying the ordinary income tax.
Only in the situation where the undertaking must either qualify
as an amateur operation, or be taxed at ordinary income rates, is an
amateur status desirable; in the majority of cases, it will be to the
taxpayer's advantage to operate the venture as a business. For example,
merely by qualifying as a business, a corporation organized to locate
and develop a mineral deposit is entitled to deduct certain exploration49
46. When a person is retired any profit making activity, however small, may be
classified as his business. Miller v. United States, 339 F.2d 661, 663 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
47. The stringent position taken by the Commissioner in denying expenses con-
nected with conventions or foreign travel as lacking a business purpose is most helpful
at this point - at least as far as arguments by analogy are useful. See Rev. Rul.
63-266, 1963-2 CuM. BULL. 88; Patterson v. Thomas, 289 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1961);
Alexander P. Reed, 35 T.C. 199 (1960).
48. United States v. Zacks, 375 U.S. 59 (1963) ; cf. United States v. Midland-
Ross Corp., 381 U.S. 54, 56-57 (1965) ; Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transp., Inc.,
364 U.S. 130 (1960); Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955);
accord, Merton E. Farr, 11 T.C. 552 (1948), aff'd sub noma. Sloan v. Commissioner,
188 F2d 254 (6th Cir. 1951).
49. The first $100,000 of exploration expenditures may be deducted from current
net income, or from future income. §§ 615(a) ; 617.
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and development"° costs from its future or current profits, and to estab-
lish a depletion schedule,5 ' and once the corporation is under way,
the shareholders may bail out at capital gains rates.2 In comparison,
it is questionable whether a venture not classed as a business would be
allowed anything other than the depletion allowance. Moreover, in-
corporation allows the shareholder-employees to participate in qualified
pension, profit sharing, stock bonus53 or group life insurance plans.
Or, should the shareholders wish to terminate the operation, maximum
gains may be realized by selling the corporation to a tax-exempt
charity,54 which frequently is willing to offer more than the going
market price;" and the 1964 income-averaging provisions further
soften the tax blow. 6
II. THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE TRADE CORPORATION
Generally, any corporation incorporated in the United States, and
selling exclusively outside the United States but within the Western
Hemisphere, may elect to be taxed under section 9 2 2 ."' Of course, the
principal disadvantage to corporate organization is that the corporation
itself is taxed at the corporate income tax rate, and then the share-
,holders are in effect taxed again on the distributed profits. But even
here, substantial savings are made possible by electing to utilize either
of two corporate forms: (1) the Western Hemisphere Trade Corpora-
tion, or (2) the Subchapter S corporation.
50. Section 616(a).
51. Almost every mineral receives some depletion allowance. While oil and gas
are allowed 271/2% (§ 613(b) (1)), and sulfur and uranium 23% (§ 613(b) (2) (A)),
the largest number fall in the 15% bracket (§ 613(b) (6)). No allowance is given to
minerals taken from sea water or from other inexhaustible sources. § 613(b) (6) (B).
52. Redemptions, tax-free property distributions, mergers, and stock-distributions
covered by Subchapter C are outside the scope of this article. See generally BITTKR &
EuSTIct, FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION OV CORPORATIONS AND S11ARgHOLD8RS (1966).
53. Sections 401, 105-06.
54. Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965).
55. Id. at 588 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). The Commissioner has announced that
the Service will continue to challenge all sales at more than fair value. Tech. Info.
Release No. 768, 1965 CCH U 6739.
56. Capital gain, as well as ordinary income, may be averaged. §§ 1302(a) (2),
1302(d) ; see also infra n.147.
57. See, e.g., Brudno, The Practical Aspects of Incorporating and Doing Business
Abroad, U. So. CAL. 1962 TAX INST. 345; Crawford, A Review of United States
Taxation of International Operations, N.Y.U. 18TH INST. ON Fto. TAX 263 (1960)
Graubart, Pitfalls of Western Hemisphere Trade Corporations, 38 TAXES 863 (1960)
Kalish, Tax Considerations in Organizing for Business Abroad, 44 TAXEs 71 (1966);
McClure, Foreign Operations of Extractive Industries, N.Y.U. 18TH INST. ON FED.
TAX 601 (1960) ; Seghers, The Western Hemisphere Trade Corporation - What It
is and How to Use it to Advantage, 42 TAXSs 582 (1964); Wender, Use of Tax
Haven Corporations and Western Hemisphere Trade Corporations, U. So. CAL. 1959
TAX INsT. 253.
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Section 922 was originally designed to allow American extracting
firms 58 burdened with high wartime taxes to compete with their foreign
counterparts ;" but like so many wartime measures, this one has, in
modified form, endured. It allows a qualifying corporation an addi-
tional deduction equal to 148 of its net profit. To illustrate, assume
that a corporation, "Sea Treasures", qualifies under section 921, and
that it has a net profit of 1,000,000 dollars after deducting its de-
pletion allowance. By virtue of section 922, the tax rate drops from
48 to 33.4 per cent, computed as follows:
$1,000,000 - (14/4 8 X $1,000,000) $708,334
$708,334 X 22% + ($708,334- $25,000) X 26% =
$333,500.32 or 33.4%
It will be noted that since the first 25,000 dollars of earnings is taxed
at only 22 per cent, this deduction becomes more and more valuable
as the net profit declines. Thus, 'had Sea Treasures earned 100,000
dollars instead of 1,000,000 dollars, it tax rate would be 27.5 per cent.
To qualify for such favorable tax treatment, a corporation must
meet four tests: (1) it must be a domestic corporation, incorporated
in a state or territory ;60 (2) it must do substantially all of its business
"in countries located in North, Central or South America, or in the
West Indies"61 except Bermuda;62 (3) it must receive ninety-five per
cent of its income from sources outside the United States ;63 and (4)
it must receive ninety per cent of its gross income from a trade or
business6 4 - a proviso inserted to prevent investment companies from
operating out of South American countries in order to reduce their
58. S. Rip. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 111 (1942) ; Baker & Hightower, The
Western Hemisphere Trade Corporation: A Problem in the Law of Sales, 22 TUL.
L. Rvv. 229, 237-40 (1947) ; Flynn, Western Hemisphere Trade Corporations: Quo
Vadis?, 12 TAX L. Rtv. 413, 416-17 (1957) ; Raskind, The Western Hemisphere Trade
Corporation: A Functional Perspective, 16 VAND. L. Rtv. 1, 5 (1962) ; Surrey, Current
Issues in the Taxation of Corporate Foreign Investment, 56 COLUM. L. Rgv. 815,
836-37 (1956); Note, Western Hemisphere Trade Corporation, 53 Gzo. L.J. 802,
803 (1965).
59. S. Rip. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1942). This argument was raised
as early as 1921. 61 CONG. Ric. 5186. At that time an amendment was written into the
House bill exempting from United States tax the foreign income of domestic corpora-
tions receiving 80% of their income from foreign sources. H.R. Rtp. No. 350, 67th
Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1921). However this amendment - primarily because it did not
exclude income from banking and other investment activities - ran into trouble in
the Senate, 61 CONG. IZc. 5883-86, 6489-94, 6540-43, 6546-47 (1921), and was not
included in the Senate bill, nor was it restored in conference. H.R. Rzs. No. 486,
67th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 (1921).
60. Sections 921, 7701(a) (4), 7701(a) (9).
61. Ibid.
62. I.T. 3990, 1950-1 Cum. BULL. 57.
63. Section 921 (1).
64. Section 921(2); Towne Sec. Corp. v. Pedrick, 53-2 U.S. Tax Cas. % 9585
(S.D.N.Y. 1953) ; see also Note, Western Hemisphere Trade Corporations, 53 Gxo.
L.T. 802, 804-05 (1965).
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tax loads. But this section, relatively straightforward as it is, would
seem plainly to exclude Sea Treasures. For by definition, " 'Western
Hemisphere Trade Corporation' means a domestic corporation all of
whose business (other than incidental purchases) 65 is done 'in any
country or countries in North, Central or South America" ;6" and even
if Sea Treasures sold its entire output in Mexico, it would still have
purchased its equipment and hired its employees in the United States,
and run its operation from there.
However, in a series of cases culminating in Commissioner v.
Pfaudler Inter-American Corp,7 the courts have refused to hold the
statute applicable only to corporations Whose business is conducted
primarily outside the United States. They have instead taken the view
that as the United States is clearly within the Western Hemisphere, all
that ;is required -is that ninety-five per cent of the corporation sales 68
take place within the Western Hemisphere but outside the United
States. And in view of the unanimity of decision from the Second6"
and Seventh7" Circuits and the Court of Claims,7 ' the Commissioner
has announced that the Service will no longer contend that a Western
Hemisphere Trade Corporation must conduct its business completely
outside -the United States.72  But what of the operation carried on
outside the territorial limits of any country - for example, twelve miles
65. The regulations provide that incidental purchases are minor or nonrecurring
and not in excess of "5 percent of the corporation's gross receipts from all sources for
such taxable year." Treas. Regs. §§ 1.921-1(a) (1), 1.921-1(b) example 2 (1957);
Rev. Rul. 61-195, 1961-2 CuM. BULL. 133; Rev. Rul. 59-356, 1959-2 CuM. BULL. 177;
G.C.M. 25131, 1947-2 CUM. BULL. 85. However, the court of claims held purchases
equal to 16.9% of gross receipts "not so substantial as to deprive the taxpayer, other-
wise eligible, of the right to the credit." Otis Elevator Co. v. United States, 356 F.2d
157 (Ct. Cl. 1966). No appeal was taken by the Government from this decision.
66. Section 921.
67. 330 F.2d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 1964) ; Commissioner v. Hammond Organ W.
Export Corp., 327 F.2d 964, 966 (7th Cir. 1964) ; Frank v. Internat'l Canadian Corp.,
308 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1962) ; A. P. Green Export Co. v. United States, 151 Ct. Cl.
628, 633-34, 284 F.2d 383, 386 (1960); Babson Bros. Export Co., 22 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 677 (1963) ; Pan American Eutectic Welding Alloys Co., 36 T.C. 284, 291
(1961) ; Barber-Greene Americas, Inc., 35 T.C. 365, 387 (1960).
68. Commissioner v. Pfaudler Inter-American Corp., 330 F.2d 471, 474 (2d Cir.
1964); Commissioner v. Hammond Organ W. Export Corp., 327 F.2d 964, 966 (7th
Cir. 1964); A. P. Green Export Co. v. United States, 151 Ct. Cl. 628, 284 F.2d 383
(1960); Pan American Eutectic Welding Alloys Co., 36 T.C. 284 (1961) ; Barber-
Greene Americas, Inc., 35 T.C. 365 (1960) ; cf. The Exolon Co., 45 B.T.A. 844 (1941) ;
Ronrico Corp., 44 B.T.A. 1130 (1941) ; East Coast Oil Co., 31 B.T.A. 558 (1934),
aff'd, 85 F.2d 322 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 608 (1936). See Krahmer, Federal
Income Tax Treatment of International Sales of Goods: A Reevaluation of the Title-
Passage Test, 17 TAx L. Rrv. 235 (1962) ; Brainerd, United States Income Taxation
of International Sales of Personal Property, 32 TAXES 359 (1954) ; Dailey, The
Concept of the Source of Income, 15 TAX L. Riv. 415 (1960).
69. Commissioner v. Pfaudler Inter-American Corp., 330 F.2d 471, 474 (2d
Cir. 1964).
70. Commissioner v. Hammond Organ W. Export Corp., 327 F.2d 964, 966
(7th Cir. 1964).
71. A. P. Green Export Co. v. United States, 151 Ct. Cl. 628, 284 F.2d 383 (1960)
cf. Otis Elevator Co. v. United States, 157 Ct. Cl. 339, 301 F.2d 320 (1960).
72. Rev. Rul. 64-198, 1964-2 CuM. BULL. 189.
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out at sea? Would a corporation so operating still qualify under sec-
tion 921 ? Within the Gulf there is no problem, for since all of the
floor ;is claimed by the United States and much of it is also claimed
by several other countries, the corporation should qualify no matter
who is deemed sovereign in this area. From a practical standpoint,
the corporation should argue that the Gulf is subject to .home ownership,
for most minerals are given a twenty-three per cent depletion allow-
ance if mined in the United States, in contrast to a fifteen per cent
allowance if mined outside it.73 Therefore, a finding of United States
ownership of the mining area will often increase the depletion allow-
ance. However, this is quite apart from any question of qualifying as
a Western Hemisphere Trade Corporation. Even in the situation where
the company operates off the coast of South America, in unclaimed
waters (a possibility nearing reality as deep-sea equipment improves)
no significant problem of qualification under section 921 arises. The
Service has indicated that all of the Continent (with the exception of
British holdings)"4 comes within the purview of this section; and this,
coupled with a recent line of cases allowing liberal inclusion, seems to
indicate that the corporation need only be domestically incorporated
and sell abroad. A company incorporated in Delaware and selling in
Argentina would thus qualify
III. THE SUBCHAPTER S CORPORATION
A corporation, if it meets certain tests, may elect to be taxed under
Subchapter S of the Code.7 5 Should this elect-ion be made, all profits
and most losses are passed through the corporation to its shareholders
where they -are taxed at each individual's regular income tax rate.
Operation as a Subchapter S corporation requires compliance with
a series of fairly straightforward tests. At the outset, a partnership or
73. Compare § 613(b) (2) (B) with § 613(b) (6).
74. Included are Greenland (Rev. Rul. 60-307, 1960-2 CuM. BULL. 214), the
Bahamas and islands off the coast of Venezuela, The Greater and Lesser Antilles, The
Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico. Rev. Rul. 55-105, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 94.
75. 72 STAT. 1650, 26 U.S.C. §§ 1371-78 (Supp. II, 1966). Subchapter S came
into Title Twenty Six in a rather unusual fashion, as part of the Technical Amend-
ments Act of 1958. It had first been proposed five years earlier by President Eisen-
hower, who suggested to Congress that corporations with few shareholders be allowed
the option of taxation as partnerships, and conversely, that partnerships be afforded
the opportunity of taxation as corporations. Only the former proposal - comprising
the present Subchapter R - was enacted. Three years later, the House urged repeal
of Subchapter R; the Senate Finance Committee not only disagreed, but offered a
redrafted version of President Eisenhower's original companion proposal, the previ-
ously rejected "corporations-taxable-as-partnerships" bill. The Senate managers pre-
vailed in conference, and Subchapter S came into being. For a more detailed history
of Subchapter S see Hrusoff, Election, Operation and Termination of a Subchapter S
Corporation, 11 VILL. L. REv. 1-2 (1965) ; revised and reprinted in 1966 Corporate
Counsel's Annual 1019-64 (Matthew Bender Co.). 7 MERTENs, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION § 41 B. 01 (1962); Moore & Sorlien, Adventures in Subchapter S and
Section 1244, 14 TAX. L. Rxv. 453, 457 (1959).
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proprietorship must be incorporated since Subchapter S is limited to
domestic corporations which are not part of an affiliated group.76 The
corporation must file Form 2553 with the district director in the
final month of the corporation's taxable year or during the first month
of the next year. 7 Once a timely election is made it remains in effect
until revoked or terminated. However, if an election is not timely it
is the same as if no election had been filed. Therefore, the attempted
election for each succeeding year fails.7" Less than eleven individual,79
non-alien"° shareholders8' are required. While a husband and wife
holding stock as community property,' as joint tenants, tenants by the
entireties or tenants in common are counted as one shareholder," none-
theless each individual must file a written consent to the election 4 -
for, in contrast to other provisions of the Code,' a single holdout
destroys the election. 6  Additionally, the corporation may not have
more than one class of stock8 7 or receive more than twenty per cent of
76. Section 1371(a).
77. Section 1372(c) (1); Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-2(a) (1960).
78. Joseph W. Feldman, 47 T.C. 329 (1966).
79. Section 1371(a) (1)-(2).
80. Section 1371(a) (3).
81. Section 1371 (a) (1). All shareholders must be individuals, usufructs or estates.
Corporations, partnerships, trusts, or voting trusts are not permissible shareholders;
although nominees, agents, guardians or custodians are. Treas. Regs. §§ 1.1371-1 (d) (1),
1.1371-1 (e) (1960) ; Rev. Rul. 65-90, 1965-1 CuM. BULL. 428; Rev. Rul. 64-249, 1964-2
CuM. BULL. 332. In addition, the election must be filed by the executor or fiduciary
(corporation in bankruptcy). Herbert Levy, 46 T.C. 531 (1966) ; Lewis Bldg. &
Supplies, Inc., 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 844 (1966). In Old Virginia Brick Co. 44
T.C. 724 (1965), aff'd, 367 F.2d 276 (4th Cir. 1966), the court ruled that a pro-
bate held open long after the administrative activities have been performed can be
deemed terminated and a trust substituted in its place. Care must be taken that the
magic number ten is not exceeded by a guardian holding stock for several beneficiaries
as the beneficiary, not the guardian, is considered the shareholder. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1371-1(d) (1960). Two years ago the Commissioner granted an exception. He
ruled that special stock issued to the Federal Housing Commissioner as required by
24 C.F.R. § 207.18(c) (1965) will not terminate an election. Rev. Rul. 64-309, 1964-2
Cum. BULL. 333.
82. Section 1371 (c) (1).
83. Section 1371(c) (2).
84. Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-3(a) (1964). These rules are strictly interpreted.
Simons v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 744 (D. Conn. 1962) ; Joseph W. Feldman, 47
T.C. 329 (1966) ; M. H. McDonald, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 647, 650 (1965) ; J. William
Frentz, 44 T.C. 485 (1965) ; William Prestcoe, 40 T.C. 195 (1963). Consent once
given is binding and may not be withdrawn after the corporation files its 2553 form.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-3(a) (1960). However, an election given by a spouse does not
alleviate the requirement that the executor file an election, even though the executor
is the surviving spouse. Lewis Bldg. & Supplies, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 844 (1966).
And should the corporation be in receivership, the trustee, not the shareholders, must
make the election. Herbert Levy, 46 T.C. 531 (1966). In addition a custodian cannot
make an election unless he is also the minor's guardian, Rev. Rul. 66-116, 1966 INT.
Rev. BULL. No. 19, 15; cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1 (a) (2) (iv) (a) (1956) (partnership
electing not to be taxed under Subchapter K) ; and § 1501 (corporations filing con-
solidated returns).
85. Sections 333(c) (1), 337(d) ; cf. § 1361(f).
86. Section 1372(a). Subsection (f) of the 1954 bill would have allowed an
election if 80% of the shareholders consented. S. R p. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
454-55 (1954).
87. Section 1371 (a) (4). This does not mean merely that the corporation may
not issue preferred and common; it may not issue two types of common. "Thus, a
484
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its income "from royalties, rents, dividends, interest, annuities, and
sales or exchanges of stock or securities, ' 8 8 nor may it derive more
than eighty per cent of its gross receipts from sources outside the
United States. 9  Because of this latter requirement a Subchapter S
corporation is prevented from also being a Western Hemisphere Trade
Corporation." The election is terminated automatically if any of the
above conditions are not met;91 the only penalty incurred as such is
that the corporation may not make a new election for five years,92
and for good cause the Commissioner may waive this provision.
9 3
However, the corporation will be taxed under the normal tax rates
during the time it was disqualified, and this in itself often is disastrous.
Each provision has on occasion caused difficulty. The require-
ment that the corporation have only one class of stock, however, has
become especially burdensome. For various reasons - perhaps to give
some shareholder preferential treatment; perhaps as the first step in an
intra-family transfer of wealth; perhaps due to ignorance - Subchapter
S corporations 'have 'been incorporated with inordinately high debt
ratios. They are said to be thinly incorporated. Unfortunately, until late
1966, once .the debt was found to be cancelled equity, the regulations
required that it ,be deemed a second class of stock and the election termi-
nated. Although the reason for restricting Subchapter S corporations to
one class of stock was somewhat speculative - little mention 'being made
of the problem in the committee reports - the generally accepted version
is that more than one class of stock would make the allocation of earn-
difference as to voting rights, dividend rights, or liquidation preferences . . . will
disqualify a corporation .. " Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g) (1966).
88. Section 1372(e) (5). There has been considerable dissension in this area. See
Temple N. Joyce, 42 T.C. 628 (1964), and the resulting 1966 legislation adding
§ 1372(e)(5)(B) to the Code. H.R. REP. No. 1238, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, 18-19
(1966). See also Valley Loan Ass'n v. United States, 258 F. Supp. 673 (D. Colo.
1966), invalidating Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-4(b) (5) (ii) ; and see also Rev. Rul. 65-91,
1965-1 Cum. BULL. 431; Rev. Rul. 65-83, 1965-1 Cum. BULL. 430; Rev. Rul. 65-40,
1965-1 CuM. BULL. 429.
89. Section 1372(e) (4). Care must be taken to insure that any recovery is sold
in the United States to prevent an involuntary termination of the election. The sale
is said to occur where title passes. Commissioner v. East Coast Oil Co., S.A., 85 F.2d
322 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 608 (1936); The Exolon Co., 45 B.T.A. 844
(1941), acq. 1947-2 Cum. BULL. 2.
90. By definition Western Hemisphere Trade Corporations receive 95% of their
gross income from sources outside the United States. § 921(1). This restriction is
not entirely fair, for, without apparent justification, different treatment is extended to
corporations and individuals than to Subchapter S corporations.
91. Sections 1372(e)(1), 137 2 (e)(4), 1372(3)(5). The election may also be
revoked if the procedure set out in § 1372(a) (2) is followed. See Alfred N. Hoffman,
47 T.C. 218 (1966).
92. Section 1372(f).
93. Treas. Reg. §§ 1372-5(a) (1960), 1.1372-5(c) (1964).
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ings and profits too complicated.94 When the proposed regulations
appeared they added the controversial requirement. 5 And this portion
of the regulations became final without change.
Four cases have dealt with this regulation; two within the past
year. In Catalina Homes, Inc.9" two principal shareholders propor-
tionally advanced funds sufficient to give the corporation a seven to one
shareholder debt-equity ratio. These loans were not represented by
notes, nor did they have a fixed maturity date. And while interest
was specified at five per cent, it was only payable at the discretion of
the board of directors. The conclusion was easily reached that these
were not, in fact, loans but, instead, contributions to capital. Once this
finding was made the validity of section 1.1371-1 (g) could have been
raised. However, counsel, at least in his brief, did not argue the point;
nor did the Tax Court see fit to raise the question on its own motion.
The court merely found that the purported loans differed from the
common stock in that the loans were entitled to five per cent interest
and a liquidation preference while the common was not. Therefore, the
loans were deemed a second class of stock.
In Henderson v. United States,97 the district court after first find-
ing that purported debt was in fact equity, summarily concluded that a
second class of stock had been issued. Even though counsel argued the
invalidity of section 1.1371-1(g), the court swept aside the question,
merely holding that "the instrument received by Frederick Henderson
from Henderson Mining Company in exchange for his advances to that
corporation constituted a second class of stock. Such being the case,
the Henderson Mining Company, Inc. did not qualify as a small busi-
ness corporation ... ""
Last summer, the Tax Court, sitting en banc met the question head
on. Unfortunately, views in W. C. Gamman,9 were quite fragmented:
two concurring opinions, sponsored by five judges, and a dissenting
opinion representing five more followed by majority opinion. The
94. See S. ReP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 453 (1954) :
The corporation may have only one class of stock outstanding. No class of
stock may be preferred over another as to either dividends, distributions, or voting
rights. If this requirement were not made, undistributed current earnings could
not be taxed to the shareholders without great complications. In a year when pre-
ferred stock dividends were paid in an amount exceeding the corporation's current
earnings, it would be possible for preferred shareholders to receive income previ-
ously taxed to common shareholders, and the same earnings would be taxed twice
unless a deduction for the earnings previously taxed were allowed to the common
shareholders. Such an adjustment, however, would be extremely difficult when
there had been a transfer of common stock in the interim.
95. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g), 24 Fed. Reg. 1991 (1959).
96. 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1366 (1964).
97. 245 F. Supp. 782 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
98. Id. at 786.
99. 46 T.C. 1 (1966).
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court held at the outset that "we do not 'believe the notes can be con-
sidered true debt obligations.... "100 The majority opinion, while some-
what vague, seems to attack the question of the validity of section
1. 1371- 1 (g) along two broad avenues. First, it considers the Com-
missioner's argument that debt found to be risk capital can in fact only
be stock. However, the regulation was not this specific. It allowed
some leeway in that it provided: "[I]f an instrument purporting to be
a debt obligation is actually stock, it will constitute a second class of
stock."'' Taking the words "'actually stock" at face value, the court
implies, if in fact it does not hold, that 'the company could not, under
the local corporation law, have a second class of stock without first
taking further formal action (such as amending its charter or by-laws).
As the corporation could not have a second class of stock, the dis-
allowed debt was not actually stock as defined in the regulation. Thus,
when the Commissioner interprets the regulation in such a manner
that he can create a second class of stock when a second class of stock
cannot legally exist, the regulation is invalid.
The alternate holding rests on the traditional argument that the
regulations go beyond the intent of Congress. The court examines
the legislative history of Subchapter S and finds little said regarding
the requirement that a corporation must not 'have more than one class
of stock. It could find no indication that a pseudo-debt obligation
must be treated as a second class of stock. As a matter of fact, it indi-
cates that a contrary presumption would be in order. If a stockholder
were specifically prohibited from loaning funds to a Subchapter S cor-
poration, the Government's position would have some merit. However,
Congress intended shareholders to loan funds to Subchapter S cor-
porations for indebtedness owed a shareholder by the electing corpora-
tion, and this is specifically provided for in section 1376.
Judge Withey's concurring opinion elaborates the majority's first
point - that a second class of stock must actually exist before section
1.1371-1(g) applies. Judge Withey would hold that unless the pur-
ported debt instrument has sufficient elements of character similar to
characteristics generally found in a share of stock, the debt cannot be
a second class of stock. And in the instant case, the notes lack suffi-
cient "stock" characteristics:
In the first place, they may be called on demand of the holder;
secondly, the interest (which under the thin capitalization cases
would be likened to dividends) is payable from the very assets of
the corporation if necessary, unlimited by its earnings; and thirdly,
100. Id. at 9.
101. Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g) (1960). (Emphasis added.)
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the amount of earnings to be derived from the capital invested
(interest) is an amount fixed by a percentage of the principal
(or investment) which is required to be paid at fixed intervals. I
know of no State which permits the issuance of any class of stock
with these characteristics.
10 2
The second concurring opinion sponsored by Judge Dawson would
go beyond the majority and hold the regulation to be invalid in all
circumstances. He argues that the recent Catalina Homes and Hender-
son decisions throw a cloud over any type of loan from stockholder
to Subchapter S corporation. This is contrary to the intent of Congress.
The requirement of a single class of stock was imposed to avoid the
complex rules of allocation and, as pointed out by the majority, section
1376 specifically allows stockholder debt. Therefore, " the second class
of stock doctrine, as stated in the regulations, is inconsistent with the
intent of Congress ... .
The dissenting opinion is very similar to the first concurring
opinion in that the issue turns on where the debt can be classified as
stock. However, Judge Raum finds the notes in question to closely
"resemble cumulative nonparticipating redeemable preferred,"' 1 4 there-
fore becoming a second class of stock. While acknowledging that the
majority 'has invalidated the regulation, Judge Raum offers nothing
to support its validity.
The fourth decision, again from the Tax Court, Lewis Bldg. &
Supplies, Inc.105 merely reaffirms Gamman.'06 Both Henderson and
Gamman were appealed. The former to the Fifth and the latter to the
Ninth Circuit. After the briefs were filed and oral arguments heard
in Henderson, the Treasury, on December 28, 1966, amended section
1.1371-1(g) of the regulations. The new provision in effect concedes
that thin capitalization is not tantamount to a second class of stock in
those situations where the "purported debt obligations are owed solely
by the owners of the nominal stock of the corporation in substantially
the same proportions as they own such nominal stock, such purported
debt obligations will be treated as contributions to capital rather
than as a second class of stock."' °7
In the type of venture under consideration, the election is gen-
erally made before operations get under way. However, situations do
occur where the venture has been carried on as a partnership for some
102. 46 T.C. 1, 13 (1966).
103. Id. at 13.
104. Id. at 14.
105. 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 844 (1966).
106. See Braverman, Special Subchapter S Situations - Regulations Run Rampant,
114 U. PA. L. REv. 680, 681-85 (1966) ; Hewitt, Some Intriguing Recent Developments
in Subchapter S, 45 TAXES 848 (1966).
107. Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g) (1966).
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time before an election is sought. But in any event, the incorporation
of a partnership or proprietorship is normally tax-free. The corpora-
tion takes the partnership's basis, and since exploration ventures are
seldom top heavy with capital, basis problems should be minimal.'08
A. Earnings and Profits
The Subchapter S corporation computes earnings and profits in
much the same manner as other corporations. On the last day of the
electing corporation's year, the earnings and profits are computed and
taxed as if they had been distributed.°9 It makes no difference, tax-
wise, if all or none of the earnings have actually been distributed.
Every person who is a shareholder on the last day is required to
include in his gross income his share of the corporation's undistributed
annual earnings."0 Accordingly, earnings attributable to stock trans-
ferred in the waning days of the corporate year will be taxed to the
transferee - though he may hold title for only one day - and not to
the transferor."' This provision allows a reallocation of family in-
come.
Therefore, assuming Sea Treasures becomes a profitable venture,
a certain amount of income splitting can be accomplished through a
well-planned "giving" program. For example, owners of Subchapter S
stock may in December give their "low 'bracket" children shares carry-
ing accumulated earnings effectively shifting the tax burden from a
high to a low bracket taxpayer. Once it becomes clear that a profit
will be realized, a substantial amount of stock may be transferred with-
out incurring any tax liability." 2 However, the Service insists that the
gift be bona fide. The regulations warn that the circumstances sur-
rounding a transfer between members of a family will be closely scru-
tinized,"' and if it is found that the transfer does not reflect the value
of services rendered to the corporation, or that no gift actually was
made," 4 the Commissioner may reallocate distributions among family




110. Ibid. However, he cannot claim the dividend exclusion allowed by §§ 34, 37, or
116, except to the extent the corporation is distributing pre-election earnings. Treas.
Reg. § 1.1375-2(a) (1964). Should the taxpayer die while the election is in force, his
estate will be taxed on all Subchapter S earnings. Rev. Rul. 64-308, 1964-2 CuM.
BULL. 176.
111. Treas. Reg. § 1.1373-1(a) (2) (1959).
112. Sections 2503(b), 2521.
113. Treas. Reg. § 1.1373-1(a) (2) (1959).
114. Ibid.
115. Section 1375(c). See Plowden-Wardlaw, Subchapter S and Partnerships as
Vehicles Governing Family Business, N.Y.U. 21sT INST. ON FED. TAX 981 (1963).
116. In Henry D. Duarte, 44 T.C. 193 (1965), a gift of Subchapter S stock from
the donor to his minor children was challenged. Rather than becoming a test case the
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experience under the partnership provisions'. and section 482 (reallo-
cation of income among related 'buslinesses) insures that while an inter-
family gift may be made, 8 the Service will be quick to challenge it
should the transaction seem the slightest bit tainted." 9
One of the novel features of taxation as a Subchapter S corpora-
tion is that today's earnings may be retained in the corporation for
several years and then distributed as dividends, without a tax being
imposed on the shareholders. Like partners, the shareholders are
decision went off on the question whether a gift had actually been made and whether
the children received the dividends purportedly paid on the shares in question.
117. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (iii) (1956).
118. Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 745-48 (1949); Visintainer v.
Commissioner, 187 F.2d 519 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 858 (1951) ; Curtis A.
Herberts, 10 T.C. 1053 (1948) ; James T. Pettus, 45 B.T.A. 855 (1941) ; Edward H.
Heller, 41 B.T.A. 1020 (1940), aff'd sub noma. Ehrman v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 607
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 668 (1941) ; see Miller v. Commissioner, 183 F.2d
246 (6th Cir. 1950). See also Alexandre, The Corporate Counterpart of the Family
Partnership, 2 TAX L. R4v. 493, 494-95 (1947); Eustice, Contract Rights, Capital
Gain, and Assignment of Income - the Ferrer Case, 20 TAX L. Rnv. 1, 34-36 (1964) ;
Mannheimer, Income Tax Status of Gifts of Family Corporation Stock, 25 TAX~s 604,
608 (1947). It is interesting to note that while H.R. Rrp. No. 9662, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1959), would have made substantial changes in Subchapter K, section 704(e)
was left unchanged. S. RiP. No. 1616, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 114 (1960).
119. The Commissioner was successful in this challenge of intra-family gifts.
Pflugardt v. United States, 310 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1962) ; Spiesman v. Commissioner,
260 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1958) ; Finley v. Commissioner, 255 F.2d 128 (10th Cir. 1958) ;
Anderson v. Commissioner, 164 F.2d 870 (7th Cir. 1947) ; Bradshaw v. Commissioner,
150 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1945) ; Grant v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 915 (10th Cir. 1945) ;
Ludwig Bendix, 14 T.C. 681 (1950) ; R. C. Coffey, 1 T.C. 579 (1943), aff'd, 141 F.2d
204 (5th Cir. 1944) ; cf. Gouldman v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 686 (4th Cir. 1948) ;
see Surrey, Family Income and Federal Taxation, 24 TAXIS 980, 985 (1946), where
it is suggested that the Treasury is justified in looking to the family as a single tax unit.
The surest way to avoid question is to transfer ownership to a trust. How-
ever, care must be taken to insure that the trust is completely cut off from any
incidenta of control by the donor. Leeb v. Jarecki, 156 F. Supp. 6, 11 (N.D. Ill. 1957).
To insure that the gift will qualify under both the income and estate tax pro-
visions care must be taken in drawing up the trust agreement that: (1) The
donor does not retain a power of disposition over income or corpus; nor retain
the power to select investments; (2) neither the income nor the corpus can re-
vert to the donor; (3) the trust is not revocable; and (4) the donor does not have
th6 power to replace adverse trustees, except in accordance with definite prescribed
standards. See H.R. Rmr. No. 1231, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-19, 69-72 (1960), and
S. Rgp. No. 1616, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). Ill-fated H.R. 9662 was twice
passed over by the Senate. See H.R. 9662, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 28, 31 (1960) ; 106
CONG. Rnc. 14667, 16745 (1960).
In addition, the minor must have the power to dispose of the trust by will and
the corpus must be distributed to the beneficiary on his twenty-first birthday unless he,
at that time, elects to have the trust continue. § 2503; Treas. Reg. § 2 5 .2503-4(c)
1958) ; Rev. Rul. 218, 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 378; Struthers v. Kelem, 218 F.2d 810
8th Cir. 1955) ; Bernie Clinard, 40 T.C. 878 (1963) ; Bonnie Heath, 34 T.C. 587
(1960) ; Peirsol, Gifts to Minors: How Effectively has the Uniform Act Functioned?,
N.Y.U. 25TH INST. ON Feo. TAX ___ (1967) ; Frazier, Recent Developments in
Trusts for Minors, N.Y.U. 21sT INST. ON Fto. TAX 299, 300 (1963). Cf. Commis-
sioner v. Herr, 303 F.2d 780 (3d Cir. 1962). In the last cited case the grantor provided
that all income would be required to be paid out when the beneficiary reached twenty-
one but he would not receive the corpus until he was thirty. The court held that the
trust may be split into two parts - income and corpus. The income account was con-
sidered a present interest and qualified as a gift by the grantor. The Commissioner,
however, has indicated that he will not accept this holding. 1962-1 Cum. BULL. 5.
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taxed on their distributive shares of the corporation's profits when
earned, not when distributed. 2 ' Retained earnings, however, may not
be paid out (on a tax free basis) to any person not a shareholder during
the year in which they were earned. And a shareholder may not sell
his shares and then draw out the funds.' 2' Similarly, he may not
transfer undistributed dividends, for these are considered personal to
him and may not 'be drawn upon by another. 22 Moreover, if he sells
all his shares and then repurchases shares, he loses, but then regains
the right to receive tax-free distribution.'23 Nor are these require-
ments unreasonable; for any other provision would allow "treasure
hunters" to accumulate treasure at low bracket rates and then to sell
out to "high bracket" individuals, who would draw out the profits of
the venture.
B. Operating Losses
The real benefit to a "wildcatting" venture derives from the way
in which Subchapter S losses are treated. Operating losses are passed
directly on to the shareholders, where they may be deducted from the
current year's personal income. 124 If such loss exceeds the shareholder's
current taxable income, he may carry it back or forward,'25 in the same
manner as any other loss - the only limit being the shareholder's
adjusted basis plus any indebtedness the corporation may have -to him.1
2
However, losses are treated some what differently from earnings. Each
is personal and may not be transferred; but losses are calculated on a
day-to-day basis, 27 while earnings are adjusted at -the end of the
year. Thus, a shareholder selling loss stock on the thirtieth of De-
cember only transfers one day's loss, whereas the sale of profit stock
on the thirtieth passes all undistributed earnings for that year. This
120. Compare § 1373 (b) with § 702. Because of the similarity of these two sections
Subchapter S corporations are often referred to as "corporations taxed like partner-
ships."
121. Treas. Reg. § 1.1375-4(e) (1959).
122. Ibid. Even a decedent's estate may not take out undistributed profits tax-free.
123. Ibid. See Mickey & Wallick, Tax-Saving Plans under Subchapter S Now
More Reliable as Result of New Regulations, 10 J. TAXATION 268, 269-70 (1959).
124. Section 1374(a) ; Hulsey v. Campbell, 64-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9144 (N.D. Tex.
1963); DuPont v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 681, 684 (D. Del. 1964), limits the
applicability of Subchapter S losses to corporations that carry on a trade or business.
It cannot be used to pass hobby losses on to shareholders.
125. Section 172(b) ; see Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (d) examples 2 & 3 (1956).
126. Sections 1374(c) (2), 1376(b) ; William H. Perry, 47 T.C. 159 (1966) ; John
E. Byrne, 45 T.C. 151 (1965), aff'd, 361 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1966) ; cf. Herbert Levy,
46 T.C. 531 (1966), requiring that the shareholders, in order to deduct the corporation's
operating loss in its final year of operation, be able to show that their stock had some
basis at the close of the corporation's final year. The concept of limiting losses to
adjusted basis plus debt was introduced as § 704(d) of the partnership provisions
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difference in treatment reflects the Treasury's policy of preventing
"high bracket" taxpayers from capitalizing on the pass-through pro-
visions of the act, since taxing losses on a daily basis eliminates any
advantage attendant on purchasing the loss stock. Otherwise the stock,
with its built-in operating loss, could be sold to a "high bracket" tax-
payer in December and he in turn could resell to a third party in
January. Parenthetically, it might be noted that preventing the passage
of accumulated earnings is not a problem, for the "high bracket" man
attempts to do everything possible to avoid taking earnings into his
gross income, and a purchase of stock in December could only add to
his income, perhaps without even netting him a dividend. 2 '
Before a loss will be allowed, the taxpayer must show that it was
incurred in the operation of his "trade or business." Normally, this
presents no difficulty. However, losses from exploration or develop-
ment operations are peculiarly subject to attack as "hobby losses."
That -is, it -may be alleged that the taxpayer is not operating a business
but is merely pursuing a hobby (which he hopes the government will
indirectly subsidize). These cases are particularly difficult to decide,
since the line between an expensive hobby and an unprofitable business
may be a thin one indeed. As a result, such cases are usually decided
on their own individual facts; but the use of a corporate form - even
that of a Subchapter S corporation, and especially if endowed with
substantial capital - adds color to the claim that the taxpayers are
operating a business.
29
To determine whether they are dealing with a 'hobby or a business,
the older decisions looked to the taxpayer's intent or motive. If he
honestly believed he was conducting a business and expects to realize a
profit, even though the possibility of his doing so is slight, his losses
were deductible. Thus, Mrs. Doggett was allowed to deduct the cost
of promoting certain religious books, once she convinced the court that
she expected to net a 200 per cent profit when the books were sold.
Although it was improbable that she would sell many volumes, the
possibility was there, and this seemed to be enough.'8 0
128. Moore & Sorlien, Adventures in Subchapter S and Section 1244, 14 TAx L.
Rtv. 453, 468 (1959).
129. Compare DuPont v. United States, supra note 124, with Temple N. Joyce, 42
T.C. 628 (1964).
130. Doggett v. Burnet 65 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1933); accord, Tatt v. Commis-
sioner, 166 F.2d 697, 698 (5th Cir. 1948). However this is no guarantee of success for
there is a line of cases denying losses when they were incurred to promote the tax-
payer's personal, rather than business interests. John H. Amon, 7 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
577 (1948), aff'd per curiam, 177 F.2d 513 (2d Cir. 1949) (purchase of a co-operative
apartment as a place in which to live not as an investment) ; James F. Curtis, 39
B.T.A. 366 (1939) (purchase of stock of land company as a condition to obtaining
membership in a golf club) ; cf. Albert G. Boesel, 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 950 (1952).
[VOL. 12 : p. 469
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The courts soon realized that intent (at least in this area) is a
most elusive factor, and to cope with the problem certain guidelines
were developed. Some courts have looked to the taxpayer's principal
business to determine if his unprofitable activity is a hobby. Thus, in
W. Clark Wise,131 the taxpayer owned an automobile agency and lost
money on a harness racing stable. Similarly, in Coffey v. Commis-
sioner,"3 2 the taxpayer collected his profits from his mining activities
and .his losses from a small orange grove where he lived; operation of
the grove was held to be a hobby. In Hirsch v. Commissioner,"'3
taxpayer owned a cannery and lost money on a racetrack. 4 Other
courts, in what seems today to be the prevailing test, consider the
magnitude of the loss and the length of time over which it has been
suffered as one such guideline. Typical is White v. Commissioner,
3 5
where the taxpayer operated a ballistics 'lab which, in the seventeen
years of its existence, lost substantial sums each year. The court
pointed out that in addition to the considerable losses over a pro-
longed period, "there was no evidence of any reasonable possibility of
the laboratory's ever generating gross income sufficient to offset its
expenses."' 36  DuPont v. United States,137 a recent and well-reasoned
case, rejected all of these tests. 8' Instead, the DuPont court applied
a substantive standard, taking into account all of the factors connected
with the taxpayer's operations.3 9 After considerable discussion, the
court seemed influenced most by two of these factors: (1) the taxpayer
would eventually realize a profit if he could develop his cattle herd,
and (2) in contrast to other gentlemen farmers, 4 ' he had no other
occupation.
Consequently, smaller operations, especially if conducted on a
seasonal basis, may have difficulty meeting the regular occupation test.
131. 16 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 361 (1957), aff'd, 260 F.2d 354 (6th Cir. 1958).
132. 141 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1944) ; cf. Alfred M. Cox, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 23
(1965), aff'd per curiam, 354 F.2d 659 (3d Cir. 1966).
133. 315 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1963) ; cf. Commissioner v. Field, 67 F.2d 876, 877
(2d Cir. 1933).
134. 315 F.2d at 733-34. This case is colored somewhat by the fact that the invest-
ment was made in an attempt to prevent a prior investment from going sour.
135. 227 F.2d 779 (6th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 939 (1956) ; but see
Whitney v. Commissioner, 73 F.2d 589, 592 (3d Cir. 1934) ; Rowe B. Metcalf, 22 Tax
Ct. Mem. 1402 (1963).
136. 227 F.2d at 780; Hirsch v. Commissioner, 315 F.2d 731, 736 (9th Cir. 1963)
Coffey v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 204, 205 (5th Cir. 1944) ; L. M. Lockhart, 43 T.C.
776 (1965) ; but see DuPont v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 681, 685 (D. Del. 1964) :
"A rule which would require that the profit motive dominate all other considerations
before one can carry on a trade or business within the meaning of the federal revenue
act is not a realistic test."
137. 234 F. Supp. 681 (D. Del. 1964).
138. Id. at 685.
139. Ibid.
140. Compare DuPont v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 681 (D. Del. 1964), with
Deering v. Blair, 23 F.2d 975 (D.C. Cir. 1928).
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The Commissioner may, not unreasonably, assert that the same tax
principles are applicable to a gentleman farmer and a part-time treas-
ure hunter. However, one qualification exists: If the firm declares its
loss - even though disallowed - and subsequently realizes a profit,
it should be allowed to deduct former operating losses from its current
profit. And it should be noted that while the courts are directly
concerned only with activities occurring in the tax year in question, they
will consider and be influenced 'by operations prior and subsequent to
those years. Thus, when Widener's stables realized substantial profits
due to stud fees in years following the ones actually in question, the
business loss was allowed,14' though only the year before Vanderbilt
had been denied a deduction in a very similar situation.' Of course,
substantial operations, employing full time personnel and involving
a large amount of risk capital, should be treated as any other similar
corporate venture would be. Should Sea Treasures earn initial profit
and then incur a loss while profits remain undistributed, the loss is
set off against ,the previously taxed undistributed income. And if
the election is terminated, undistributed earnings may only be taken
out tax-free after all pre-election earnings have been distributed.
44
Clearly, a corporation electing at the outset, rather than after a re-
covery has been made, need not 'be concerned with this problem. On
the contrary, if its shareholders withdrew their profits as earned, they
could not 'be locked-in and losses generally could be utilized.
One of the principal advantages of the Subchapter S corporation
has always been the treatment of capital gains. Section 1375 allows
long-term gains from the sale of property not held primarily for sale
in the ordinary course of trade or business 45 to be passed through to
the shareholders. 46 If we may refer back to our discussion of capital
gains it will be recalled that underwater prospecting carried on in the
corporate form may put the corporation into the treasure hunting
business, and a determination that the corporation is in such a busi-
ness will deprive its shareholders of capital gains treatment of the
proceeds resulting from the sale of any treasure they recover. How-
ever, one caveat must be noted: "If the Commissioner has previously
141. Commissioner v. Widener, 33 F.2d 833, 837 (3d Cir. 1929) ; cf. FTC v.
Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 598 (1965) (court looked to post-merger
activity to determine illegality of merger) ; Thompson v. Commissioner, 322 F.2d 122,
127-28 (5th Cir. 1963) (court looked to activities occurring prior to tax year in ques-
tion to determine taxpayer's business).
142. Deering v. Blair, 23 F.2d 975 (D.C. Cir. 1928).
143. Section 1375(d) (2) (B).
144. Treas. Reg. § 1.1375-4(a)-(b) (1960).
145. Section 1375(a)(1). Section 1221(a)(1) and Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-1(b)
(1957), further define this provision.
146. Section 1375(a) (1).
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ruled, in connection with hobby losses, that the corporation is not
engaged in the business of recovering treasure, he may be estopped
from now asserting the contrary. In any event, this problem does
not concern the mining or producing firm which sells its corporate
assets realizing capital gain at the corporate level, and, of course, it
is principally this type of organization which utilizes the Subehapter S
corporate form. Thus, shareholders, by filing a timely election, are
allowed to include capital gains in their income in the same manner
as 'if they, not the corporation, held title to the property sold. 4"
A recent amendment 48 added paragraph (e) to section 1375 and
alleviated the difficulty inherent in the requirement that gains must be
distributed in the year in which received. Previously, if a corporation
realized its gains early in the year and later in the same year suffered
losses, the capital gains were converted to ordinary income. More-
over, the corporation that waited until its books were closed had
difficulty distributing the proceeds before the end of the year, and
while closing the books early, or running a trial balance before the
year ended was acceptable for small firms, it became increasingly diffi-
cult as the firm grew. Paragraph (e) avoids this dilemma by allowing
a distribution made within seventy-five days after close of the corpo-
ration's taxable year to be treated as if made before the year had ended.
The only requirements are that the shareholders, at the close of the
year, maintain their positions until the distribution occurs, 49 and 'that
the distribution be pursuant to a board resolution. 5 ° This resolution
must be made in the year of sale, but it need only order that some of
the anticipated capital gain be distributed; the balance may be retained
for future distribution or may be reinvested.
Often a corporation, similar to Sea Treasures, would find itself
holding greatly appreciated capital assets. Rather than selling its prop-
erty, paying the corporate tax, and distributing the proceeds - taxed
in turn as dividends - it would elect, sell, then terminate. '' The
so-called "one-shot election" effectively eliminated one tax. In an
147. Capital gains are subject to the income averaging provisions. § 1302(a) (2)
see H.R. RnP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 180 (1963), and Treas. Reg. § 1.1304-5(d)
(1966), for an example illustrating the mechanical application of the capital gains rule.
See also Goldberg, Income Averaging under the Revenue Act of 1964, 74 YALE L.J.
450, 479 (1965). Hrusoff, Election, Operation and Termination of a Subchapter S
Corporation, 11 VILL. L. REv. 1, 4 (1965).
148. 78 Stat. 19, 112, 26 U.S.C. 1371 (1964). See generally S. REP. No. 830, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess. 145-46 (1964).
149. Section 1375(e) (2).
150. Section 1375(e) (1).
151. The corporation may easily terminate, even if termination was imminent when
the election was made. § 1372(e) (1) ; Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-4(b) (3) (1960) ; Haupt-
man v. Director of Internal Revenue, 309 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 909 (1963). See also Patty, Qualification and Disqualification under Sub-
chapter S, N.Y.U. 18TH INST. ON FED. TAX 661, 682-83 (1960).
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attempt to restrict "one-shot elections" Congress early in 1966 enacted
remedial legislation. 152 A new section, 1378, was added to the Code.
This section is designed 'to impose a capital gains tax at the corporate
level if an election is undertaken merely to pass capital gain directly to
the shareholders. To insure that the bona fide Sub chapter S corpora-
tion was not taxed, a series of escape clauses were written into the
statute. At the outset any corporation filing an election within a month
after incorporation, 53 or any corporation having operated under Sub-
chapter S during the three years immediately preceding the sale,' is
outside section 1378. In addition the corporation must have taxable
income, including capital gain, of more than 25,000 dollars ;155 it must
have capital gain exceeding 25,000 dollars ;156 and finally, capital gain
must be greater than ordinary income. 5 7 If the Commissioner cannot
show that the corporation meets all four tests its entire gain is passed
through to the shareholders. Thus, a corporation reporting capital
gain of 750,00 dollars and ordinary income of 751,000 dollars, or one
with an 800,000 dollars gain offset by a 776,000 dollars operating loss
is exempt. 5 " Sea Treasures can easily qualify. Election before opera-
tions are begun - assuming it has been determined that the venture
should in fact operate a Subchapter S corporation - will turn the
trick.
152. H.R. RFp. No. 1238, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-8 (1966); S. Rep. No. 1007,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7, 16-19 (1966).
153. Section 1378(c) (2).
154. Section 1378(c) (1).
155. Section 1378(a) (2).
156. Section 1378(a) (1).
157. Ibid.
158. For other examples see S. Rvp. No. 1007, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1966).
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